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Abstract 
In this article we propose a qualitative ( ordi­
nal) counterpart for the Partially Observable 
Markov Decision Processes rnodel (POMDP) 
in which the uncertainty, as well as the prefer­
ences of the agent, are modeled by possibility 
distributions. This qualitative counterpart of 
the POMDP model relies on a possibilistic 
theory of decision under uncertainty, recently 
developed. 
One advantage of such a qualitative frame­
work is its ability to escape from the classi­
cal obstacle of stochastic POMDPs, in which 
even with a finite state space, the obtained 
belief state space of the POMDP is infinite. 
Instead, in the possibilistic framework even 
if exponentially larger than the state space, 
the belief state space remains finite. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Partially 0 bservable Markov Decision Processes 
model (POMDP) is a general model for sequential de­
cision problems in which effects of actions as well as 
results of observations are noisy, and the noise is rep­
resented by probability distributions. 
The POMDP model takes its justification from the 
most widely used theory for decision under un­
certainty : the expected utility theory [Savagel954] 
[von Neumann & Morgensternl944). It is theoreti­
cally very attractive but its practical use remains diffi­
cult, especially because it involves infinite state spaces. 
In this article we propose an ordinal counterpart of the 
POMDP model in which uncertainty as well as pref­
erences are modeled by qualitative possibility distri­
butions that take their values in a finite ordinal scale. 
The underlying decision criterion is based on the use 
of the Sugeno integral which is an ordinal, maxmin, 
counterpart of the Choquet integral generalizing the 
expected utility criterion. It has received axiomatic 
justifications in the style of von Neumann and Morgen­
stem [Dubois & Pradel995] and recently in the style 
of Savage [Dubois, Prade, & Sabbadinl998]. 
In the next section we will describe the usual frame­
work of fully and partially observable markov decision 
processes as well as some classical resolution meth­
ods. We will recall, in particular, how POMDPs can 
be restated as fully observable MOPs on the (infinite, 
continuous) belief state space, thus leading to define 
methods that approximate the value of optimal poli­
cies, either by updating a value function, or by dis­
cretizing the continuous belief state space. 
Then, in section 3 we will give some back­
ground on the possibilistic utility functions advo­
cated by [Dubois & Pradel995], and we will see how 
[Fargier, Lang, & Sabbadinl998] proposed to extend 
them to multistage decision making (in a fully ob­
servable domain). In particular, we will recall some 
decomposability properties that allow to use dynamic 
programming-like algorithms to solve such possibilis­
tic multistage decision problems (that we call 11-
MDPs). In [Fargier, Lang, & Sabbadinl998], espe­
cially, a backwards induction algorithm is proposed, 
for solving finite-horizon 11-MDPs. In the present ar­
ticle, we first give a slightly different version of this 
algorithm, which makes it similar to the value itera­
tion algorithm used for solving classical MOPs, and 
allows to handle the infinite horizon as well as the fi­
nite horizon case. 
Section 4 is the central part of the paper : here we will 
recall how conditioning can be defined (not uniquely, 
by the way) in possibility theory. We will then de­
fine a possibilistic counterpart of POMDPs which, we 
will show, can be handled by finite domain 11-MDP 
algorithms, even if considering partial observability in 
11-POMDPs makes the computation of optimal poli­
cies exponentially (in space and time) more difficult 
than in the completely observable case. 
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2 M ARKOV DECISION 
PROCESSES 
2.1 FULLY OBSERVABLE MARKOV 
DECISION PROCESSES 
The standard MDP model [Puterman1994] is defined 
by : 
• A set T C IN of stages in which decisions must be 
taken. When Tis finite (T = {0, . . .  N}), N is the 
horizon of the problem. 
• For each stage t, a finite state space, St. 
• Sets A, ,t (finite) of available actions in state s at 
stage t (these sets are denoted A, when they do 
not depend on t). 
• The rewards r(s, a) that are obtained after a has 
been applied in state s. These rewards may be 
negative, thus considered as costs or penalties. 
• To each action a E A, t applied in state s E St 
is assigned a probabilit� distribution p(·Js, a) de­
scribing the uncertainty about the possible suc­
cessor states in St+l· 
A decision rule d1 is an application from St to 
Uses,As,t assigning an action to each possible state 
of the world in stage t. The set of these decision rules 
is denoted by Dt. A policy 8 is, in the finite horizon 
case, a n-tuple of decision rules 8 = (d1, ... , dN) where 
N is the horizon of the problem. d = D1 x ... x DN 
is the set of applicable policies. In the infinite hori­
zon case, or in the stationary finite horizon case, the 
parameter t has no influence on the decision problem. 
Thus, a policy 8 is nothing but the repetition of an 
identical decision rule d. 
A policy 8, applied in an initial state so, de­
fines a Markov chain that describes the sequence of 
states occupied by the system (the trajectory T = 
{so, ... ,sN}). The value of a policy in a given state 
is the expected sum of the rewards gained along the 
trajectory. In the finite horizon case, it is : 
N 
v(o,so) = E(Lr(st,dt(st))) (1) 
t=O 
When the horizon is infinite, the above expected sum 
may be unbounded. Therefore, future rewards are usu­
ally discounted, which is in accordance with the fact 
that immediate rewards shall be more important than 
future ones. In this case, the discounted value of a 
policy is defined by : 
00 
v(o, s0) = E(L'Yt ·r(s,dt(s))) (2) 
t=O 
where 0 < 'Y < 1 is the discounting factor (the sum 
converges, since 'Y < 1). 
Solving a MDP amounts to finding a policy J* max­
imizing v(·,s0). The dynamic programming methods 
[Puterman1987] are based on the decomposition of 
the sequential decision problem into one-stage decision 
problems, by making use of the Bellman's equations 
[Bellman 195 7]. 
In the finite horizon case, an optimal policy for an 
MDP is obtained as the solution of the following sys­
tem of equations : 
Vt E 0, . .. , N  -1,Vs ESt, 
v1(s) = max {r(s,a) + L Pa(s'Js) · vt+1(s')} (3) aeA,,t 'ES 3 t+l 
Optimal policies can be computed by the backwards 
induction algorithm [Puterman1987], which solves the 
above equations in decreasing order oft. 
Algorithm 1: Backwards induction 
begin 
tt-N+1; 
Vs, vN+! (s) � 0 ; 
while t 2: 1 do 
t�t-1; 
for s ESt do 
"' p(s'!s a)· vt+l (s')} · L,....,'ESt+l ' ' 
+ l vt(s) � max.EA •.• {r(s,a) 
D;(s) = argmaxaeA,,,{r(s,a) + 
Ls•es,+, p(s'Js,a) . vt+l(s')} ; 
return v0(so), {8*} 
end 
D; ( s) is the set of optimal actions in state s and stage 
t, { o*} is the set of policies such that Vt E 0, . . .  , N, 
Vs E 51, d;(s) E D;(s). 
In the discounted infinite horizon case, optimal poli­
cies can be obtained as fixed points of equation 
(3). Methods such as the value iteration algorithm 
[Bellmanl957], [Bertsekas1987] can be used to com­
pute these optimal policies which furthermore, are sta­
tionary. 
In the value iteration algorithm, the function Q*(s, a) 
represents the value of performing action a in state 
s. It is used instead of v(s), which is the value of 
performing the optimal action in state s. Q* ( s, a) is 
defined by 
Q*(s, a)= r(s, a)+ 'Y · L p(s'Js, a) · v(s') (4) 
s'ES 
Algorithm 2: Value iteration 
begin 
Arbitrary initialization of v on S ; 
repeat 
forsESdo 
l for a E A do Q(s, a) .-- r(s, a) + 1 · 
L:,'eS p(s'Js, a)· v(s') ; 
v(s) .--max, Q(s, a) ; 
until Q converges to Q*; 
return Q* 
end 
and Vs E S, v(s) = max..eA , Q*(s, a). 
Results about the convergence of algorithm 2 can be 
found in [Bertsekas1987]. It is easy to get an optimal 
policy J• from Q*, since J*(s) = argmaxaQ*(s,a). 
Many other algorithms have been designed to solve 
infinite horizon MDPs, a review of which can be found 
in [Puterman1994]. 
2.2 PARTIALLY OBSERVABLE MARKOV 
DECISION PROCESSES 
POMDPs [Monahan1982] [Lovejoy1991] are a general­
ization of MDPs in which it is not assumed that the 
agent knows precisely the state s of the system, in each 
decision stage. Its imprecise belief is modeled by a be­
lief state b, which is a probability distribution on the 
state space S, regularly updated by observations. 
The observation model consists of an observation set 0 
of possible observations and a set of probability distri­
butions over 0, p(-Js,a), where, for all o E O,p(oJs, a) 
is the probability of observing o after a was applied 
and the resulting state of the system is s. 
The usual MDP techniques cannot be applied directly 
to a POMDP since they assume that the current state 
of the system, s, is always known. A way to solve a 
POMDP is to assume that it is a MDP over the belief 
state space. After performing action a in belief b, the 
agent does not know the precise state of the system, 
but it can compute a resulting belief state ba, that it 
can update to b� when it observes o. 
[Cassandra, Kaelbling, & Littman1994] gave the fol­
lowing equations, linking b, ba and b� : 
ba(s) = L p(sJs',a) · b(s') 
31€5 
ba(o) = L P(oJs, a) · ba(s) 
•ES 
bo( )  _ p(oJs,a) · ba(s) h b ( ) ...t. O a s - ba(o) w en a o r 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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ba ( o) is the probability of observing o when perform­
ing a in b. In other terms, ba(o) is the probabil­
ity of being in belief state b� in these conditions : 
ba(o) = p(b�Jb,a). It is indeed a transition probability 
in a new MDP relating belief states. 
The Bellman equation of this new MDP is the follow­
ing: 
where r(b, a) = L:.es r(s, a) ·b(s) is the average reward 
that can be collected in b and Ab is the set of the 
actions that are available in at least one possible state. 
The obtained MDP has a continuous state space 
which makes its resolution difficult (PSPACE complete 
[Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis1989]). 
[Cassandra, Kaelbling, & Littman1994] proposed to 
construct an approximation il of v* (the fixed 
point of (8)) and to improve it over time steps. 
Others, like [Parr & Russell995], [Brafman1997] or 
[Hauskrecht 1997] propose to discretize Bt and com­
pute optimal policies over the obtained finite subset of 
the belief space. 
3 POSSIBILISTIC FULLY 
OBSERVABLE MULTISTAGE 
DECISION 
3.1 POSSIBILISTIC DECISION CRITERIA 
[Dubois & Prade1995] proposed an ordinal counter­
part, based on possibility theory, of the expected util­
ity theory for one-stage decision making. In this frame­
work, Sand X are respectively the (finite) sets of pos­
sible states of the world and consequences of actions. 
L is a finite totally ordered (qualitative) scale, which 
lowest and greatest elements are denoted respectively 
OLand 1£. 
The uncertainty of the agent about the effect of an 
action a taken in state s is represented by a possibility 
distribution rr(·Js, a) :X -+ L. rr(xJs, a) measures to 
what extent x is a plausible consequence of a in s. 
rr(xJs, a) = 1£ means that x is completely plausible, 
whereas rr(xJs, a) = OL means that it is completely 
impossible. 
In the same way, consequences are ordered in terms 
of level of satisfaction by a qualitative utility function 
J.l : X -+ L. J.L(x) = 1£ means that x is completely 
satisfactory, whereas if J.L(x) = OL, it is totally unsatis­
factory. Notice that rr is normalized (there shall be at 
least one completely possible state of the world), but 
J.l may not be (it can be that no consequence is totally 
satisfactory). 
570 Sabbadin 
[Dubois & Prade1995] proposed the two following 
qualitative decision criteria : 
u*(a, so)= maxmin{rr(xlso, a), p(x)} (9) 
xEX 
u.(a,so) = minmax{n(rr(xlso, a)), p(x)} (10) 
xEX 
where n is the order reversing map of L. 
Note that u• (a, s0) corresponds to the degree of inter­
section of the fuzzy set of plausible consequences of 
a in s0 (which membership function is rr(-lso, a)) and 
the fuzzy set of preferred consequences (which mem­
bership function is p). u.(a, s0) is instead a degree of 
inclusion of the first fuzzy set into the second. 
u• can be seen as an extension of the maxi max crite­
rion which assigns to an action the utility of its best 
possible consequence. On the other hand, u. is an ex­
tension of the maximin criterion which corresponds 
to the utility of the worst possible consequence. u. 
measures to what extent every plausible consequence 
is satisfactory. 
u• corresponds to a very adventurous (optimistic) atti­
tude in front of uncertainty, whereas u. is conservative 
(cautious). We will focus on the second criterion in 
the rest of the paper, as we will have some guarantee 
that the conservative-optimal policies eventually lead 
to some non totally unsatisfactory state (we have no 
similar guarantee with adventurous optimal policies). 
3.2 II-MDP : THE FINITE-HORIZON 
CASE 
In [Fargier, Lang, & Sabbadin1998], the possibilistic 
qualitative decision theory has been extended to finite­
horizon, multistage decision making. 
In this framework, the qualitative (conservative) util­
ity of a policy t5 in state s0 is defined by the qualitative 
expectation (min max) of the minimum of the degrees 
of satisfaction of the states of the possible trajectories : 
u.(t5,so) = min max{n(rr(rlso, t5)), p(r)} (11) T 
where, if r = {so, . . .  , SN }, p(r) = min;eo N p(s;) 
and rr(rlso,t5) = min;eo .. N-1 rr(si+lls;,d;(s;)). 
algorithm performs such a computation (in the case 
where intermediate satisfaction degrees are not con­
sidered) : 
Algorithm 3: Possibilistic backwards induction 
begin 
t +-- N; 
Vs, u:;' (s) +-- p(s) 
while t > 1 do 
t+--t-1; 
for s ESt do 
l u�(s) +-- maxaeA, 
min,•es,+, {n(rr(s'ls, dt(s))), u�+l(s')} ; 
D;(s) +-- argmaxaeA, 
min,•es,+, {n(rr(s'ls, dt(s))), u�+1(s')} ; 
return u�(so), {t5* E Djj} 
end 
Note that because of the idempotency of the 
minimum operator, there are optimal policies that 
may not be found by such an algorithm, unlike in the 
stochastic case. Anyway, every policy returned by the 
algorithm is optimal, and has the property that any 
subpolicy applied from stage t to N (the horizon) 1s 
optimal (see [Fargier, Lang, & Sabbadin1998]). 
3.3 II-MDP : A VALUE ITERATION 
ALGORITHM 
Let us now change a bit the data of the problem, in or­
der to recover one that admit stationary optimal poli­
cies in the infinite horizon case. First of all, suppose 
that the state spaces, the available actions and the 
transition functions do not depend on the stage of the 
problem. Suppose also that a utility function Jl on S 
is given, that expresses the preferences of the agent 
on the states that the system shall reach and stay in. 
We finally assume the existence of an action stay, that 
keeps the system in the same state (or equivalently, an 
action do-nothing, if we assume that the system does 
not evolve by itself, without any action applied). 
Then, under these assumptions, we are able to define 
a possibilistic counterpart of the value iteration algo-
rithm, that computes optimal policies from iterated 
The possibilistic counterpart of the Bellman equation modifications of a possibilistic value function. 
is the following: First, we have to define {J*, the possibilistic counter-
u� (s) = max min{p(s), ,min max{ n( rr(s'is, a)), u�+l(s')} p
art of Q-functio?�· As in the sto�hastic case, Q*(s, a) 
aeA, s es,+, evaluates the "ut1hty" of performmg am s. We have a 
u� (s) == p(s) (12) 
In [Fargier, Lang, & Sabbadin1998] it is shown that 
any policy computed backwards by successive applica­
tions of ( 12) is optimal according to u. . The following 
similar property as in the stochastic case, that is that 
the optimal possibilistic strategy can be obtained from 
the solution of the following equations : 
Proposition 1 The optimal strategy can be obtained 
from cr the solution of the following set of equations : 
Q*(s, a) = minmax{n(rr(s'ls, a)), u.(s')}, s'ES 
where u.(s) = maXa Q*(s, a). 
Then, we define a possibilistic version of the value it­
eration algorithm that computes Q* : the possibilistic 
value iteration algorithm (algorithm 4). 
Algorithm 4: Possibilistic value iteration 
begin 
u.(s) = tt(s), 'Is E S ; 
repeat 
for s E S do 
l for a E A do 
Q(s, a) +-
min,,es max{n(rr(s'ls,a)), u.(s')} ; 
u.(s) +- maXa Q(s, a) ; 
until Q converges to Q*; 
return Q* 
end 
This algorithm converges to the actual value of Q* in 
a finite number of step. This is easy to show, once it is 
noticed that the sequence of functions ( Q*) computed 
by the algorithm takes its values in a finite set and 
is non-decreasing. The number of iteration is, by the 
way, bounded by the size of the set of possible value 
functions : IAI x lSI x 1£1. As one iteration of the 
algorithm requires lSI x lA I evaluations of Q( s, a), the 
overall complexity of finding an optimal policy is in 
O(ISI2 X IAI2 X ILl). 
Notice that unlike in the stochastic value iteration al­
gorithm, the initialization of u. is not arbitrary. Notice 
also, that after k iterations of the algorithm, the Q­
function allows to determine the "best" policies that 
allow to reach goal states in no more than k actions. 
Moreover, the policies that are computed are not only 
the best according to the pessimistic utility, but among 
the best, they are those that guarantee a shortest path 
to a goal state. 
Example 
A robot is located somewhere in a room. The point 
is to define a policy that is able to bring it into the 
down-right square of the room shown in Figure 1. The 
objective will be partially satisfied if the robot ends 
in one of the neighbor squares. The state-space and 
the utility function tt on the objective states (taking 
its values in a finite subset of the interval (0, 1]) are 
depicted in Figure 1. tt(B33) = 1, p(s23) = p(s32) 
0.5 and p(s) = 0 for the other states. 
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Figure 1: State space and utility function. 
The available actions are to move (T)op, (D)own, 
(L)eft, (R)ight or to (S)tay in place. If the robot 
chooses to stay, it will certainly remain in the same 
square. If it goes T, D, L or R it will (entirely) possi­
bly reach the desired square ( 1r = 1) if it is free but it 
will be possible that it reaches a neighbor square, as 
depicted in Figure 2 for the action R. The other tran­
sition possibility functions are of course symmetric to 
these. 
� � � I� 
�� �� 
Figure 2: Transition possibilities for moving right. 
Let us now compute the optimal actions after one it­
eration of algorithm 4. For every action a and state s, 
we have Q1(s, a) = min,'esmax(1- rr(s'ls, a), p(s')) 
( rr does not depend on the stage) and u! ( s) = 
-1 maxae{T,D,L,R,s}Q (s, a). 
Figure 3 Resumes the utility of each state after one 
iteration, as well as an action that is optimal if the 
problem is assumed to be solved in one iteration only, 
for each state with a non-null pessimistic utility. The 
optimal action is uniq4e, except for state s33 for which 
D and R would be optimal actions as well. 
Figure 3: Optimal policy, computed at iteration 1. 
Now we can iterate the process and get an optimal pol­
icy. The iterated process is described in Figure 4. Note 
that after 4 iterations, the utility of each state and the 
associated optimal action do not change anymore. 
The number of iterations required to find a stationary 
policy is about the number of steps of the longest path 
from any state to goal state S, actions being assumed 
to be deterministic. 
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Figure 4: Pessimistic optimal policy computation. 
4 POSSIBILISTIC PARTIALLY 
OBSERVABLE MULTISTAGE 
DECISION 
4.1 BACKGROUND ON POSSIBILISTIC 
CONDITIONING 
Conditioning has been defined in possibility theory 
(see [Dubois & Prade1994] for a complete presenta­
tion). As applied to events, possibilistic condition­
ing shall obey a form which is similar to the one of 
Bayesian conditioning : 
1/A, B, IT( An B)= IT(BIA) *IT( A) (a) 
where * can be min (see [Hisdal1978]) or product. 
As the framework we choose to consider is purely or­
dinal, the only choice left is the operator min. Unlike 
in Bayesian conditioning, equation ( o:) does not have 
a unique solution II(BIA). It is common then, after 
[Dubois & Prade1990], to choose the solution to ( o:) 
which has the minimum specificity, thus leading to de­
fine II(BIA) as : 
IT(BIA) = 1L ifii(AnB) = IT(A) >OL and II(BIA) = 
IT(A n B) otherwise. 
Once the conditioning of possibility measures has been 
defined in this way, the conditioning of a possibility 
distribution by an observation o E 0 ( rr( ·lo)) can be 
defined as : 
Definition 1 Conditional possibility distribution : 
rr(slo) = 1L if rr(s, o) = II(o) and rr(slo) = rr(s, o) 
otherwise. Where IT(o) = max,rr(s,o) and rr(·, ·) is a 
joint possibility distribution over S x 0. 
4.2 POSSIBILISTIC POMDPs 
We have already seen how classical POMDPs can be 
translated into MOPs over a belief state space. In 
a similar way, we are going to see how possibilis­
tic POMDPs (II-POMDPs) can be translated into IT­
MOPs over a possibilistic belief state space. 
First of all, let us define a possibilistic belief state, f3 
as a possibility distribution over the state space, ex­
pressing a plausibility ordering over the states. Unlike 
the set of probabilistic belief states, the set of possi­
bilistic beliefs is finite, as soon as we assume that the 
possibility degrees take their values in a finite set L 
(the cardinal of the possi bilistic belief state space B is 
bounded by lSI X ILl). 
Suppose now that as in the probabilistic case, the 
transition possibilities rr(sls', a) are given, as well as 
the observation possibilities rr(ols, a). Similarly to 
[Cassandra, Kaelbling, & Littman1994] we can define 
f3a(s) as the possibility of reaching state s, from an 
initial belief f3 and after the execution of action a : 
f3a(s) = max min{rr(sls' , a), f3(s')} (13) 
&'ES 
We can also compute the possibility of observing o E 0 
after having applied a in the (possibilistic) belief state 
[3 :  
f3a(o) = maxmin{rr(o ls, a), f3.(s)} (14) ses 
Now, [3� is the revised possibilistic belief state, after a 
was applied in f3 and o was observed : 
• f3�(s) = OL if rr(ols, a) = OL, 
• f3�(s) = lL if rr(ols, a)= f3a(o) > OL, (15) 
• [3g ( s) = f3a ( s) in the other cases. 
Then, all the elements of the new II-MOP over possi­
bilistic belief states are defined in equations (13), (14) 
and (15). The new II-MOP may be intuitively ex­
pressed as : from a state f3, applying action a may lead 
to one of the 101 states [3�, the possibility of reaching 
[3� being f3a(o) = rr(olf3,a). 
From now on, the "possibilistic" Bellman equation 
(pessimistic case) can be extended to the partially ob­
servable case : 
u�(f3) = max min{�J(/3), minmax{n(f3a(o)), u�+1([3�)}} aEA8 oEO 
(16) 
where �J(f3) = min,es max{ n(f3(s)), �J(s)} and u�(/3) is 
initialized to �J(/3). 
In the same way, the Q function becomes : 
Q(f3,a) = minmax{n(f3�),u.(f3�)} (17) 
oeO 
Algorithm 4 can now be extended to the partially ob­
servable case (in case no intermediate satisfaction de­
gree is involved). 
Algorithm 5: Possibilistic value iteration in the par­
tially observable case 
begin 
u. (,B) = J.l (,B), 'I f3 E B ; 
repeat 
for f3 E B do 
l for a E A do 
Q(,B, a) +-- mino§O max{ n(f3a(o)), u.(,B�)} ; 
u. (,B) +-- maXa Q(f3, a) ; 
until Q converges to Q*; 
return (J* 
end 
Here, B is the set of belief states, which size is at 
most ILP51. For a given f3 and a given a, evaluat­
ing Q(,B, a) needs 101 computations of (3�, which needs 
about lSI elementary computations (as {3� is immedi­
ately deduced from f3a ( o) ) . The algorithm will perform 
at most IBI x ILl x IAI iterations before convergence. 
Finally, the overall complexity of the algorithm is in 
O(l£12151+1 x IAI2 x JOI). This worst-case complexity 
is of course exponential in the size of the state space, in 
the general case, but it can be reduced when the sub­
set of belief states that can be reached from an initial 
belief state is small. 
Example 
Le us take again the preceding example, but assume 
now that observability is no more complete : all what 
the robot knows when it is in a given state (square) 
is the configuration of the walls around the square. 
Initially, the robot observes nothing, that is it can be 
anywhere in the state space depicted in figure 1. 
Let us assume also that the observations are not noisy, 
then it can be shown that the belief states that can 
be reached from the initial belief state, applying any 
policy are limited to the following set of subsets of 
S :  B = {S, {s21,s32}, {sn}, {s23}, {s32}, {s33}, 
{ su, SJ3}, { s2I}}. These 8 belief states will be denoted 
by (30 to (37. We can compute J.l(f3;) from the utility 
function over S : J.l(f3o) = J.l(f3J) = J.l(f32) = J.l(f3s) = 
J.l(f37) = 0, J.l(f33) = Jl(f34) = 0.5 and J.l(f35) = I . 
The possibilities of transition from any belief state to 
any other, given an action a can be computed from 
the f3a ( o) 's and the (3� 's, for o E 0. For example, if 
the initial belief state is (30 = S, and the action that is 
performed is (D)own, then the resulting belief states 
can be (31, (33 or ,135 with possibility 1L, and f32 with 
possibility 0.2. 
The utility function is modified after each iteration : 
• Iteration 1 : u.(f35) = 1 = Q(f35, S) ; u.(f33) = 
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0.8 = Q(f33, D) ; u. ((34) = 0.8 
u.(f32) = 0.5 = Q(f32, D); 
• Iteration 2 : u.(f32) = 0.8 = Q(f32, D) ; u.(,BI) = 
0.5 = Q(,B1, R) ; u.(f37) = 0.5 = Q(f37, R) ; 
• Iteration 3 : u. (,BI) = 0.8 = Q(f3I, R) ; u. ((37) = 
0.8 = Q(f37, R) ; u.(f3s) = 0.5 = Q(f3s, D) ; 
u.(f3o) = 0.5 = Q(f3o, D) ; 
• Iteration 4: u.(,Bs) = 0.8 = Q(f3s, D) ; u.(f3o) = 
0.5 = Q(f3o, D) ; 
Iteration 5 does not change any value, so the algo­
ri thm has converged to the following optimal policy 
(which pessimistic utility is 0.8 whatever the initial 
state, except if the initial state is (35, where its util­
ity is 1) : (f3o, D), ({31, R), ((32, D), (f3a, D), ((34, R), 
((35, S), (,Bs, D), ({37, R). 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this article we have proposed a qualitative coun­
terpart of POMDPs, based on possibility theory, and 
in particular on the use of the pessimistic possibilistic 
decision criterion advocated in [Dubois & Prade1995]. 
The possibilistic view of multistage decision under 
uncertainty permits a kind of decomposability of 
the sequential problem that allows to use dynamic 
programming-like algorithms for computing optimal 
policies. In particular, after we described the pos­
sibilistic backwards induction algorithm proposed in 
[Fargier, Lang, & Sabbadin1998] for the finite-horizon 
case, we proposed a modified version, similar to the 
value iteration algorithm, able to cope with problems 
in which the horizon is not fixed a priori. 
In order to take partial observability into account in 
the possibilistic framework, we need to use condi­
tioning. Unfortunately, unlike in the stochastic case, 
there exists no universally accepted notion of condi­
tioning. We chose the one proposed by [Hisdal1978] as 
it fits well our qualitative (ordinal) framework and it is 
rather intuitive. Once a possibilistic notion of condi­
tioning is adopted, it is possible to see how belief states 
(i.e. possibility distributions) are updated after an ac­
tion is applied and an observation is made. Then, we 
were able to define the ll-POMDP framework and we 
showed how ll-POMDPs can be translated into fully 
observable ll-MDPs over an exponentially larger (but 
finite) state space. 
The algorithm that we proposed for computing op­
timal policies in the possibilistic partially observable 
case is based on the possibilistic value iteration algo­
rithm used in the fully observable case. Another ap­
proach could be used in which a ll-POMDP is viewed 
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as a game against Nature : trying to maximize the 
value of the pessimistic criterion amounts to behave 
like in a game in which Nature chooses the "worst 
possible" observation, after an action is applied. 
F inally, the compatibility of the possibilistic decision 
criterion with some structured representations of deci­
sion problems, particularly in the framework of possi­
bilistic logic should be pointed out. In (Sabbadin1998] 
it is shown that the possibilistic (pessimistic) one stage 
decision problem can be stated as an abduction prob­
lem with two stratified bases of formulas, one for mod­
eling uncertain knowledge and the other for model­
ing gradual preferences. Extending this framework to 
the multi stage, partially observable case, would allow 
to elaborate a structured language for ll-POMDPs as 
well as dedicated resolution algorithms. 
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